Assisting the Guilty 37

general obligation“to remove evil from its midst,” but in the manner in which it has determined is appropriate and just.

Informing the Authorities of Criminal Behavior

A closely connected question to that of defending one accused of a crime is that involving the so-called duty to inform. Again, a classic Talmudic text introduces the problem, from Baba Metzia 83b-84a, as follows:

Rabbi Eleazar, son of Rabbi Simeon , met a police officer, who was arresting thieves. Rabbi Eleazar said to him[the police officer]: “How are you able[to detect] the thieves...? Perhaps you take the righteous innocent and leave behind the guilty!” The police officer replied:“But what can I do? It is an order of the[secular] King.” [Rabbi Eleazar then attempted to instruct the policeman as to how to determine who was a thief and who was not]-.... The matter was heard in the House of the King. They said:“Let the one who reads the letter be the messenger.” Rabbi Eleazar, son of Rabbi Simeon , was then brought to the court and he proceeded to arrest thieves. Rabbi Joshua ben Korchah sent[this message] to him:“Vinegar, son of wine![You defamer of your father’s good name!] How long will you deliver the people of our God for slaughter?” Rabbi Eleazar sent[back] to him:“I am destroying thorns from the vineyard.” Rabbi Joshua responded:“Let the owner of the vineyard come and destroy his thorns.”... And also[a similar circumstance to this occurred] to Rabbi Ishmael, the son of Rabbi Jose . The prophet Eli­ jah met him[and] said to him:“How long will you hand over the people of our God for execution?” Rabbi Ishmael responded: “What can I do? It is an order of the King.” Elijah retorted:“Your father fled to Asia; you can flee to Laodicea .”

So Baba Metzia records that two sages of the Gemara were rebuked—one by Rabbi Yehoshua and the other by the prophet Elijah —for assisting the secular government in the prosecution of criminals, suggesting clearly that this conduct is not proper. This position seems clearly to be codified in halakha by Shulkhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 488:9, which states:“It is forbidden to denounce a Jew before the gentile authorities, even if he is wicked and a sinner. Anybody who so denounces his fellow Jew forfeits his place in the world to come.” But the full and literal import of this clear provision has been nullified, essentially, by its routine interpretation as applying only to turning over a per­