system itself and which places strict limitations upon the freedom and discretion which the halakhist enjoys. That is, proposed rabbinic decisions, no matter how extensive their Talmudic justification or how urgent their appeal to ethical necessity, are invalid when they run counter to the consensus opinion of the preponderance of halakhic authorities. It hardly needs emphasis that the innovations championed by liberal halakhists generally do contradict the consensus. One who wishes to argue for the halakhic validity of these suggestions must therefore prove that the contemporary rabbi may safely ignore the weight of consensus. Berkovits, it must be concluded, does not do this. His portrayal of a halakhic process in which rabbinic discretion is the rule is thoroughly one-sided. It explains neither the realities of halakhic practice nor the rabbis’ own conception of how the system functions.
On the other hand, there exists a rabbinate which does conduct its halakhic business according to the Berkovits guidelines. The rabbis of the Conservative movement of North America have long declared their loyalty to the traditional halakhah. At the same time, speaking as individuals or through the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the Rabbinical Assembly , they have frequently taken stands which are totally at odds with the position of the halakhic consensus. In The Halakhic Process: A Systemic Analysis,” Joel Roth, a leading halakhic authority for the Conservative movement, sets out to prove that the legal decisions of his movement meet the criteria of validity recognized by rabbinic law. He therefore confronts the same theoretical problem which faces Berkovits: may the contemporary authority ignore or overrule the halakhic consensus?
Like Berkovits, Roth studies the immanent rules and procedures of halakhah. He differs, however, in his effort to explain halakhah as a system much like all other legal systems. He draws heavily upon the literature of modern jurisprudence,
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