PETER KNOBEL

Sinclair in his analysis of the rerefah comes to a noteworthy conclusion:

It would appear that where the indirect termination of the life of a critically ill patient would result in the saving of a viable life, as is the case of organ transplants or the allocation of scarce medical resources Jewish law would, in principle, legitimate such an act, provided that an institutional framework existed for assessing the effect of such a deed upon the moral fabric of society and for administering discretionary punishments. In all cases involving the killing either directly or indirectly of a terefah, the killer would be exempt from the death penalty and his fate would be decided by extrajudicial bodies. These bodies would have at their disposal a whole range of sanctions, including death. Presumably, where proof was brought to the effect that the death of a terefah has been brought about in an indirect fashion for the sake of saving a viable life, those involved in the relevant acts would not be subject to any sanction.”

Sinclair’s suggestion that killing be allowed for sake of piquah nefesh is very interesting. It means that he believes that one life can be sacrificed for the sake of another life. While he still wishes to maintain the distinction between direct and indirect means, the issue of intent is important.

The Talmud, ” in discussing capital punishment, uses Leviticus 19:18"Love your neighbor as yourself" to argue that one should chose for the condemned criminal a mitah yafah, an easy death. Rashi defines a mitah yafah as a rapid death or one that does not humiliate the

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