102 Mark Washofsky

in a conventional and comprehensible form.” This insight builds upon prevalent trends in critical theory that deny the existence of objective, universal, rational foundations from which knowledge is derived and upon which reason operates.” The absence of such foundations implies that decision making, legal or otherwise, is best understood as a“situated” enterprise, dependent upon contexts that are shaped by prior experience, ideology, and similar influences. These contexts, in turn, are not factual givens; they are conventions, accepted patters of classifying data and of directing thought, the socially constructed starting points of reasoning.” And the act of construction takes place largely in the form of the stories we tell about ourselves, about others, and about the world. Small wonder, then, that the law, which is a discourse of reasoning and arguing about the meaning of facts, rules, and texts, is replete with narrative technique.” In the words of one Israeli scholar:**

Judges often choose the tool of narrative, especially when describing the facts of the case they are called upon to decide. Every factual account presented in a judicial decision, like any other narrative, involves a series of choices: the facts that will be included, the facts that will be omitted, the order in which they are placed, and their description. Similarly, the judge must choose a point of view from which the facts will be related, a character that will express them, and those points of the story in which, explicitly or implicitly, the voice of the commentator shall intervene. The creation of judicial narratives is a work of sophistication that requires much more than the bringing together of the relevant facts. The judicial narrative paves the way toward the normative decision, because it allows the decision to be seen as natural and as demanded by the reality that the narrative describes.