110 Mark Washofsky

where the tinok shenishbah motif functions in the Talmud as a purely hypothetical device to explore the status of a single individual, in Maimonides ’ hands it becomes the narrative of an existing community, a group of human beings whose Jewish status is of vital interest to the Jews who live alongside them. From the theoretical discussion in the Talmud , in other words, Maimonides deduces some far-reaching practical legal consequences. Second, Rambam ’s version of the captive infant story conflates the two conflicting interpretations of that motif in the Talmud : does one who was a captive infant commit his sin out of error, in which case he bears some guilt for his action, or out of the coercion of outside forces, in which case he is exempt from all guilt? The standard halakhah, as we have seen, follows the first interpretation, as even Maimonides attests,” but here, in his narrative rendition of the Karaites story, the tinok shenishbah is“like one who is coerced, which is certainly a more lenient and sympathetic characterization of his religious status. In these two respects, Rambam has rewritten the narrative of the captive infant, advancing it significantly beyond the“original intent” of its Rabbinic creators. That narrative, far from being a“soft” literary embellishment upon or substitute for a“hard” technical legal argument, is in fact the argument, the absolutely necessary legal basis for Rambam ’s policy of conciliation and respect toward the Karaites . In the absence of this narrative construction of Karaite history, he would be unable to offer a halakhic justification for the moderate and accommodating conclusions he puts forth in his Commentary, his Code, and his responsa.®’ Narrative, in other words, forms the indispensable core of Rambam ’s halakhic argument; without this story, his legal analysis would make no sense.“Legal fiction” it may be(I would prefer to call it the narrative extension of-a legal metaphor), but its fictional quality does not in any way lessen its legal force.

As suggested above, however, no legal narrative is self­authenticating. A story, even when told by a jurist of giant reputation,