Narratives of Enlightenment 131

correct interpretation of Judaism . Under these circumstances, it is arguably senseless to brand those who have moved away from observance as“apostates,” a term that after all implies consciousness that one has transgressed against an accepted and authoritative standard of behavior. And if the large, non-observant segment of Jewry is not to be condemned as heretical, there is little or no need to call upon the Orthodox community to separate from it. The choice of story, of narrative construct, therefore, is crucial: one story justifies a stance of separatism and sectarian isolation, while the other would help explain how the Orthodox community might remain involved within the general Jewish community structure and intensely engaged with Jews whose approach to Judaism might otherwise be seen as heretical. In choosing their narratives, therefore, the proponents of both sides portray a particular kind of Orthodox community, each characterized by its own very different conception of what it means to be a community of observant Jews in modern times. More than that: each author presents an image of himself as a particular kind of rabbi, community leader, and custodian of the literary tradition of Jewish law.

SOME CONCLUDING, EXTREMELY UNSCIENTIFIC NOTES ON LIBERAL HALAKHIC PRACTICE

Narratives therefore do not stand outside social authority— they are part of it. So the value of the narrative criticism of law lies not in invoking some abstract idea of narrative to challenge law, but in examining, critiquing, and revising the particular narratives embedded in law, and the identities and institutions these narratives enable.'”

I have argued that narrative is an inescapable component of legal and halakhic process. This narrative tendency is ubiquitous in the halakhah as well as in law generally; legal decision IS inextricably bound up with storytelling and, indeed, could hardly take