104 Mark Washofsky

philosophical literature primarily agadic or doctrinal contexts,” “human dignity” serves as a source for practical legal decision (halakhah[’'ma’aseh). For example, the Sages suggest that some of the Torah ’s commandments are based upon this principle.” More to the point, they bequeath to us the classic maxim gadol k'vod hab'riyot,“Great is human dignity, on account of which a negative precept of the Torah may be set aside,” which in its literal reading suggests a potent halakhic reach.” The tradition, to be sure, seeks to limit the potentially radical implications of this maxim: concern for“human dignity” can override a Rabbinic prohibition but not a Toraitic one.” This restrictive reading, of course, flies in the face of the literal meaning of the maxim, and subsequent commentators have expended no little effort in attempting to resolve that contradiction.” Even so, the halakhah goes so far as to modify a number of Toraitic obligations when their fulfillment would tend to compromise human dignity. For example, one who comes upon an unburied corpse(met mitzvah) must bury that corpse immediately even if one was on the way to circumcise his son or to offer his Passover sacrifice. Even though delay in the performance of those obligations normally involves divine punishment, one buries the corpse first, because k vod hab'riyot takes precedence.” The requirement to bury the met mitzvah extends even to a priest (kohen), who is normally prohibited from defiling himself through contact with a corpse other than that of a close relative. He must subject himself to defilement in this instance“out of concern for human dignity.” Similarly, the laws of carrying on Shabbat can be modified with respect to a corpse,“on account of the principle of human dignity.” One may be exempt from the Torah ’s requirement to return a lost object to its owner if in doing so one might be unduly burdened or one’s dignity would be insulted.” The principle has retained its halakhic power in the post-Talmudic age, where leading post-Talmudic authorities have cited it in support of their decisions. R. Meir of Padua permitted the son of a m'shumad(a convert to Christianity ) to replace the name of his father with that of his grandfather, so that he will not be called to the Torah as“ben(the son of)” the m'shumad. He bases this ruling, in part, on the principle gadol k vod hab'riyot.”” R. Yosef ben Lev