106 Mark Washofsky

halakhic problem. Moreover, while some later halakhic authorities, as we have seen, do cite k vod hab'riyot as a justification for their rulings, they tend to make it, at best, a marginal consideration. For example, in the decisions of Meir of Padua, Moshe Isserles , Yosef ben Lev, and Rav Kook cited above, the principle never serves as the exclusive or decisive basis for the ruling(p sak). Each decision stands on its own, on the basis of other legal considerations; each would be fully justifiable even had its author not mentioned the consideration of“human dignity”. In Blidstein’s reading, k’vod hab'riyot plays at most a rhetorical function in these cases: it is an expression of the posek’s sensitivity to the moral issues at stake, even though it is entirely superfluous from the standpoint of formal halakhah. The principle thus loses its legal heft and is reduced to the status of a vague and general moral exhortation. This state of affairs strikes Blidstein as somewhat puzzling. After all, k'vod hab'riyot is obviously a central element of Jewish doctrine;“there is no question that entire institutions of the halakhah exist in order to protect the dignity of the human being created in the divine image.” How, then, can it be that“the actual halakhic reach of the concept of human dignity has been, relatively speaking, so modest, in all Jewish communities throughout history?!’ The emphasis here is on the words“halakhic reach.” Human dignity may be a “great” thing, and the need to preserve it may stir much Jewish ethical thinking. As a legal principle, however, as a reason or motivation for concrete halakhic decision, it has proven to be limited in scope and in power. Why?

Blidstein offers two explanations. The first, which we might call a theological rationale, has to do with the problematic, even radical implications of the principle. It is one thing to say that“human dignity” is central to the Torah’s concerns, but it is quite another thing to say that the principle is weighty enough to override a commandment of the Torah . Is it indeed possible that some (many?) laws of the Torah are insulting to human dignity, to the point that we must decide to reject the former on the strength of the latter? Could the Author of the Torah have committed such a blatant transgression against k‘vod hab'riyot? It is not surprising