Druckschrift 
The internet revolution and Jewish law / edited by Walter Jacob
Seite
108
Einzelbild herunterladen

108 Mark Washofsky

relevant to liberal Jews who, unlike their Orthodox counterparts, are not unwilling to engage in the ethical critique of the commandments of the Torah and of the substantive rules of the halakhah. In addition, the present inquiry is not one ofcritique but of construction. Our argument for a halakhic value of personal privacy in the halakhah does not imply a negative appraisal of various commandments or substantive rules of halakhah; on the contrary, it affirms those laws and builds upon them. Of much greater interest is Blidsteins legal rationale, namely that abstract principles likehuman dignity play a minor, even inconsiderable role in halakhic discussion. To the extent that this is the case, on what grounds can this or any abstract principle serve as the basis for the far-reaching claim that the halakhah recognizes a value calledpersonal privacy that is nowhere mentioned explicitly in the sources?

Any adequate response to this challenge, I think, must begin by noting that Blidsteins legal rationale is not unique to the

halakhah. General principles perform a limited, severely circumscribed function not only in Jewish law but in virtually all advanced legal traditions. The history of most legal systems is characterized by the movement away from adjudication based upon general and abstract principles toward the reliance upon discrete rules,definite, detailed provisions for definite, detailed states of fact thatadmit of mechanical or rigidly logical application.' Rules, interpreted by means of traditional techniques of judicial interpretation, declare what the law in fact is, and as such they are obligatorynot only upon the community at large but specifically upon the judge or the commentator. By contrast, general principles(for example,one must conduct commercial transactions in good faith;it is wrong to profit from ones own misdeeds), precisely because they are general and not mechanical orrigidly logical in their application, do not determine the legal outcome in a particular case. A principledoes not even purport to set out conditions that make its application necessary. Rather, it states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision.' Principles differ