Mark Washofsky
38 Human Rights Act of 1988, Article 8. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42 contents(accessed May 4,2011). On
the other hand, a recent decision of the House of Lords suggests that the English courts have not accepted the existence of a common law right to privacy, so that the right must be fixed by statute; Wainwright v. Home Office[2003] UKHL 53, http:/ww w.publications.parliament.uk/pa 1d200203/1djudgmt/jd031016/wain- htm (accessed May 4, 2011).
39. For example, the federal Privacy Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. p-21, http://lawslois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/P-21 page -1.html(accessed May 4, 2011).
40. Chok Haganat Hap'ratiyut, 1981, Sefer Hachukim 1981, p.
J
K'vod Ha'adam http:/www.knesset.gov.il/laws special/heb/yesod3.pdf(accessed May 4, 20
recheruto. Article 7, Sefer Hachukim 1992, p.
41. Judith Jarvis Thomson ,“The Right to Privacy,” in F. D. Schoemen, ed. Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy (New York : Cambridge University Press , 1984), p. 272. See also J. Thomas McCarthy , The Rights of Publicity and Privacy , Second Edition(St. Paul: Thompson/West, 2005), vol. 1, sec. 5:59:“Like the emotive word‘freedom,’‘privacy’ means so many different things to so many different people that it has lost any precise legal connotation that it might once have had.” and Daniel J. Solove ,“A Taxonomy of Privacy,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 154(2006), p. 479:“Privacy seems to be about everything, and
therefore it appears to be nothing.”
42. Daniel J. Solove (see preceding note) is exemplary of this approach. His “taxonomy” of privacy relies upon a Wittgensteinian“family resemblance” approach to the problem. Concepts can be“related” to each other through"2 complicated network of similarities ov erlapping and criss-crossing” even though they do not share an essential core element that is common to all usages of the concept; Ludwig Wittgenstein , Philosophical Investigations , translated by G.E.M. Anscombe(Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), sec. 66, cited by Solove at p. 485. The taxonomy is meant to show that all sorts of“privacy” violations are part of the conceptual network suggested by the term.“Privacy” is therefore a substantive and useful concept, even if not all invasions of the privacy right involve the same sorts
of harm.
43. Diane L. Zimmerman,“Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort,” 68 Cornell Law Review(1983), pp. 292-367.