16 Mark Washofsky

or might have, but the only way to induce him to reveal that information is through the use of torture. That word, I stress at the outset, is by no means easy to define. As one scholar notes, although“torture” has been widely discussed in legal literature, these debates have not settled on a uniform definition, and many lawyers and judges have used the term without defining it.” It is clear, of course, that“torture” involves a measure of physical abuse. Modern Hebrew, which includes the writings of jurists and political theorists, translates the word as‘inu i, drawn from a Biblical Hebrew root that evokes the sense of physical affliction or suffering, whether imposed by an oppressor(e.g., Exodus 1:11-12, Deuteronomy 26:6) or undertaken by an individual for religious reasons as act of contrition or self-denial(e.g., Leviticus 16:29 and 31). But how much abuse is required in order for an action to qualify as“torture”? Most interrogation of criminal suspects takes place under conditions that cannot be described as pleasant, but we presumably do not consider interrogation on a prima facie level to be identical with torture. Moreover, investigators can employ any number of non-physical techniques, ranging from the making of threats against family members to the ceaseless playing of loud music, that easily fall under the category of mental or psychological abuse; are these to be considered torture? One international compact includes the infliction of non-physical suffering in its definition:"

(t)he term“torture” means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

Notice, in addition, that the above standard makes no effort to specify the intensity of inflicted suffering, whether physical or mental, necessary to qualify an act as torture. The critical aspect is the intent of the measures undertaken by law-enforcement officials. On the other hand, the title of another compact suggests that“torture” is substantively