30 Mark Washofsky ourselves, our community, and its relation to the world that we are likely to accept at face value the Maimonidean statement that the government authorities have the power to“contend with, curse, beat, and pull the hair” of any person who refuses to fulfill the obligations that the Torah imposes upon him. For Warhaftig, then, no less than for Barak, the contrast narrative is no“mere” story, extraneous to his substantive legal argument. His story is law, for in the absence of that story his legal argument would lose its coherence, its ultimate sense.

Liberal Halakhah: What Is Our Narrative? In both of these juristic writings, then, narrative plays a crucial and determining role. Without Barak’s narrative rendition of the“distinction between a democratic state and its enemies,” it would be reasonable for a court to conclude that the established police power to conduct“investigations” into criminal conduct would by its nature encompass a wide range of policies“that the security forces deem necessary in the fight against terror.””" In the absence of Warhaftig’s narrative, an observant Jew might well be persuaded that the halakhah forbids torture as an offense against human dignity(kevod ha’adam or kevod haberiyot). Each author seeks to demonstrate that“the law” says one thing or another about torture as a law-enforcement technique, but neither of them could accomplish his purpose without the narrative structure that he creates in his opinion. Thus, as we liberal halakhists come to consider our own responses to this question, we would do well to begin by inquiring into the narratives that we tell in the determination of our understanding of the halakhah. What sort of story do we tell about our conception of Jewish law?

The answer is not a simple one. On the one hand, it seems clear that we would reject Warhaftig’s story out of hand; we liberals, after all, are proud citizens of the Western civilization that he attacks. Yet, however, uncomfortable we may be with his assault upon the social and political values of our culture, we are also Jews and, therefore, heirs to the same Torah that he reveres. We, too, speak the language of mitzvah and duty when we interpret our religious heritage to ourselves and others. Though our liberal theological discourse may exalt the doctrines of individual religious freedom and autonomy, as religious Jews we believe that good and evil are real categories and that individual autonomy does not entitle the individual to choose evil. When Warhaftig declares that in the eyes of Jewish law the suspect has no“right” to withhold information that would save lives, we agree with him: a person in this situation bears the moral duty to speak up, to perform the mitzvah