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The fetus and fertility : essays and responsa / edited by Walter Jacob and Moshe Zemer
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ABORTION AND THE HALAKHIC CONVERSATION

Maimonides, on the other hand, writes as follows:

This, too, is a negative Toraitic commandment: you shall not spare the life(nefesh) of the pursuer. For this reason the sages ruled that when a woman has travail in childbirth it is permitted to dismember the fetus in her womb, either medically or surgically, because it is like a pursuer(kerodef) who seeks to kill her. Once its head has emerged it may not be harmed, because one life does not override another life. And this is the way of nature.

Unlike Rashi , Rambam defines the distinction in M. Ohalot 7:6 entirely within the context of the Talmudic discussion of the rodef. Where Rashi reads the conclusion of the discussion-"she is being pursued from Heaven"- as an indication that the fetus is not a rodef, Rambam apparently applies this phrase only to the child upon emergence; prior to that point, it is to be categorized as a pursuer. Like any other pursuer, the fetus may be destroyed because it endangers the life of another."For this reason" it may be stopped if necessary at the cost of its life.

This ruling has caused much puzzlement to subsequent halakhic commentators. Surely, they write, Rambam must agree with the plain sense of the Talmudic passage that rejects the designation of the fetus as a pursuer.'® Moreover, how does one explain the distinction between the fetus before and after emergence? If it is considered a rodef and may be killed because it threatens the mother's life, why may it not be harmed following its emergence from her womb? Does it not still"pursue" her? And how can a fetus be called a pursuer when it cannot form intent to kill and when its"pursuit" is the result of a natural process? Nonetheless, it is possible to defend Rambam 's interpretation and to declare the fetus a rodef* And the fact that an halakhic authority of towering prestige explains the warrant for abortion in terms of pursuit and aggression introduces an important factor into the process of legal decision-making. If we adopt his view, we might conclude that the fetus may never be aborted unless it poses a clear and present danger to the mother. In

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