that childbirth would jeopardize the mother's life. While the abortion does have to be justified- there apparently must be some warrant for the destruction of the fetus- Trani casts this in terms of the mother's"need" and"healing", reasons which do not necessarily involve mortal danger.
A far different approach is taken by R. Yair Bacharach(d. 1702), who considers the case of a woman who became pregnant in an adulterous relationship.>* Having repented and returned to her husband, she seeks an abortion so as to spare her the pain of raising a child who would be a permanent reminder of her sin. Where Maharit produces a relatively simple and straightforward answer, Bacharach creates a complex structure which moves first toward a permissive answer and then, inexorably, toward a prohibitive stance. He builds his argument for leniency by rejecting a suggestion that a confessed adulteress has no business turning to a rabbi with such a request. The issue has nothing to do, he retorts, with her marital or moral situation, nor with the fact that the child would be a mamzer. The real question is whether there is any sin in destroying a fetus. The answer is apparently"no". Relying on many of the sources cited by Trani, he notes that the fetus is not a nefesh until it emerges from the womb. On this ground- and not, he says explicitly, because it is considered a rodef- it is sacrificed on the mother's behalf."If so, it would seem that the law answers your question with an unqualified'yes'(heter gamur)." At this point, however, Bacharach's argument turns sharply. He notes that there is a widespread custom among both Jews and Gentiles to abstain from performing abortions, as a preventive measure against licentious behavior. Moreover, he continues, Jewish law itself suggests that Gentiles("the children of Noah") are forbidden to destroy the fetus; therefore, since Jews are not permitted anything that is prohibited to Gentiles, that prohibition must apply to us as well.” He then offers other arguments against abortion and proceeds to refute the permissive proofs he had raised before. In the case of Sanhedrin 72b, he suggests that Maimonides is right. The apparent meaning of the Talmudic sugya, that the fetus is not judged a rodef, is now reversed. It is precisely because the fetus endangers the mother's life that the prohibition against feticide is lifted in this case. The fetus ceases to be considered a pursuer only upon emergence from the womb, for
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