that Jewish law recognizes an equity jurisdiction similar to that which existed at one time alongside the English common law and within, though not separate from, the Roman law.** The same rabbis who are empowered to apply the rules of the formal halakhah are likewise entitled to judge cases according to other, more fluid principles of general justice when in their view the established law would produce an unfair or socially undesirable result. This explanation would account for the decision of Maimonides in our case, and it would clearly fit the theory and practice of halakhah in liberal Jewish circles. As suggested above, however, it does not correspond to the behavior of the vast majority of halakhists since the close of the Talmudic period, who do not, as a rule, feel authorized to deviate from the settled law on the basis of such principles as"time to act for the Lord".* Historical, theological, and jurisprudential explanations for this trend vary and abound. For our purposes it is enough to stress that it is the centuries-old tendency in Jewish law, a rule proven by Rambam ’s striking and all too rare exception.
With respect to our subject, post-Talmudic halakhists might well agree that, for reasons of community policy, it is better in some cases to permit conversions that are undertaken for ulterior motives. And some leading rabbinic scholars of the past two centuries have made that ruling. Where they differ from Rambam is that, lacking Maimonidean levels of self-confidence, most(though not all) are loathe to deviate openly from the accepted legal norm. Their task is to demonstrate that, contrary to first impressions, no such deviation is involved, that the established law in fact allows these conversions.
I. Kluger, Hoffmann, Grodzinsky: Positivism in the Service of Leniency
The problem of conversion for ulterior motives has become a much more pressing issue for halakhists during the past two
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