MARK WASHOVSKY

the accepted rule and deny conversion on the grounds that the Gentile wife does not have the proper religious motivations is to allow an intermarriage to continue to exist. To enforce the law is to weaken Jewish life, to lower its powers of resistance against the rising tide of assimilation. To relax the halakhic standards on conversion, on the other hand, would help save this couple and their children for Judaism . The reasoning is certainly compelling, but it may be wrong. For one thing, Rambam ’s lenient ruling may not be a legitimate potential interpretation of the halakhah in our case;®! in situations such as this, the surest course of action is the more conservative approach(i.e., following Rashba, to refrain from abetting an improper conversion and marriage). Moreover, assuming that all agree on the"end" to be achieved--here, to combat intermarriage--the stringent approach of Rashba is perhaps the best means of achieving it. A plausible argument can be made that in the face of widespread disregard of Jewish law the worst thing we can do is to relax the observance of halakhic standards. Such a tactic, which promises sinners a reward for their transgression, can hardly engender respect for the Torah and its commandments. To compromise on our devotion to the mitzvot may therefore weaken the intensity and quality of Jewish religious life--the very goals that Uziel seeks to attain. In other words, while Uziel follows the precedent of Rambam , the better policy may be that advocated by Rashba, who refused to allow conversion and marriage in a similar case. The determination of the"better policy" would seem to demand an empirical study based upon sociological and demographic data, yet Uziel cites no such data to support his preference for Rambam over Rashba. We return, therefore, to our question: on what halakhic basis are we entitled to follow Rambam as opposed to the other authorities?

Clearly, the only reason is that Uziel says so. The identification of Rambam as"the" authoritative precedent is an act of choice, a stated preference for one opinion over another, supported not by halakhic argumentation but by the poseq’s

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