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70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
7.5.
76.
77
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79.
Compare Feinstein to Kluger, who arrives at his permissive ruling through a similarly forced argument. Unlike Feinstein, Kluger seems to accept that argument as persuasive, so that it is not so obvious that in his case the legal justification is but a"mask" or a "smokescreen" concealing the true motivations of his decision.
Feinstein uses the term me‘akev(an absolute, sine qua non requirement) to describe acceptance of the mitzvot: without that acceptance, there is no conversion, even bedi‘avad.
Resp. Mishpetei Uziel, v. 1, Yore Deah, no. 14. See notes 9 and 10, above.
The language of Tosafot, Yeb. 24b, s.v. lo.
Mishpetei Uziel, Even Ha'ezer, no. 18. He adds that"we are allowed to make ourselves hedyotot and facilitate the conversion" in order to combat intermarriage. Hedyotot refers to the ignorant judges who improperly converted insincere proselytes during the days of David and Solomon; Yad; Isurei Bi‘ah 13:15. It is, to say the least, unusual for a poseq to look upon these judges as models worthy of our imitation.
See Mishpetei Uziel, EHE , no. 18: in our day, to combat the threat of intermarriage, it is necessary to convert the Gentile spouse,"relying in this matter upon our teacher , the Rambam ".
Uziel's language here is not as precise as it might be. The prohibition against this man marrying this woman is certainly derabanan(M. Yeb. 2:8); the suggestion that to accept an insincere proselyte violates only a rabbinic provision assumes that, bedi‘avad, the conversion is valid. Elsewhere(EHE , no. 18), Uziel states that this is his view. Were he to hold with the authorities who invalidate such conversions, the prohibition would be
absolute indeed.
On the limits of precedent in Jewish law see Elon, pp. 768-804, and Zorach Warhaftig , "Hatakdim Bamishpat Ha'ivri", Shenaton Hamishpat Ha'ivri, vols. 6-7(1979-1980), pp. 105-132.
The authors of the Shulhan Arukh, for example: R. Yosef Karo declares that the law shall follow the majority view among a panel of leading rishonim, while R. Moshe Isserles holds to the rule that"the law is according to the latest authorities". See their introductions to, respectively, the Bet Yosef and the Darkhei Moshe commentaries to the
Tur.
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