that the(Jewish ) man will remain in a permanent state of sin having marital relations with a non-Jewess...and since the conversion was permitted ab initio, it is obvious that they may have huppah ve-qiddushin(a Jewish wedding)."*?
Herzog appears to be contradicting himself. How can we explain the diametrically opposite approaches to conversion in these two responsa? Did the Chief Rabbi change his mind in the six years between the two responsa? Was he more lenient in this 1941 case because it relates to a situation in the Land of Israel?
In the second section of this permissive responsum, Herzog changes his tone and writes in a prohibitive manner very similar to his letter to the Swiss rabbinic body:
"Albeit the halakhah is in accordance with those who say that they are all converts(post factum, even if they converted for an extraneous purpose), but nevertheless| am in doubt regarding such conversion in our day; because in the days of the Sages and the Decisors, of blessed memory, there was almost no room within the Congregation of Israel for a non-observant Jew. Therefore it was permissible to accept the promise of a convert to keep the mitzvot, even if there was a material motive for the conversion, because otherwise his existence was precarious. However, to our great distress, the situation is so riotous today that Jews according to the halakhah are among the most unobservant of Israel , and many of them are leaders of communities, and even leaders of our Nation...why should this gentile keep the commandments when so many Jews are not observant...the(convert’s) acceptance of the mitzvot is doubtful when there is an ulterior motive for the conversion...we must therefore judge these persons to be doubtful proselytes. The law has changed when they come to us for conversion, so we must refuse them because...we
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