In post-Talmudic times official ordination(or in Babylon, official appointment) has ceased. Our present semikhah is merely the use of an old name; it is actually only a license to teach, although it uses the formula"he may judge." Modern rabbis considered that their right to judge in certain cases, which in the past required official judges, inheres in the fact that they are agents of the judges of the past. Now our question really amounts.to this: Is conversion one of those religious functions which in the past would require official judges and therefore now require"ordained" rabbis who are deemed to be their direct agents, or is it rather akin in status to such civil matters which even in the past could be adjudicated by laymen?
The fullest discussion of the question of conversion is found in the Talmud in Yevamot 46 and 47. The Talmud concludes at the bottom of 46b that the incident described on that page proves that a court of three is required for conversion. Then it raises but rejects the supposition that the court must be composed of mumhim, learned officials. However, although mumhim were not required for conversion in those days, it nevertheless may be that nowadays scholars(talmidei hahamim) may nevertheless be required and that ordinary laymen are ineligible. There are certain functions which for various reasons came to be restricted to scholars(therefore generally rabbis), for example, matters of marriage or divorce, or matters of releasing vows, etc. Is conversion to be considered such a matter which today must be left to scholars(i.e., rabbis)?
The Talmud in Qiddushin 62a and 62b gives a discussion which begins with the question of heave offering, starting with the statement that a man may not give heave offering from fruit that is still unharvested for fruit that is already harvested. It then moves to a discussion of whether a man may say to a woman,"I hereby
190