Woodchopper Revisited 17

of reasoning. Analogy in this context is contrasted unfavorably with rules, clear statements of the halakhah that one receives from a teacher or a knowledgeable scholar: we would much prefer to decide a case based upon the latter source of information than upon the former. Analogy may be the path we take when we have no other, better recourse for learning the law. But it is and remains a speculative and uncertain means of proof; as the Talmud rhetorically puts it: “Shall we issue a ruling in an actual case merely because we can draw an analogy?” This, perhaps, is simply another way of saying that, just as lawyers and ethicists have never conclusively solved the“problem of importance” that attaches to every analogy, neither have the rabbis succeeded in removing the element of judgment that exists in each use of this form of reasoning. As we have seen, analogy by its nature requires a measurement of probabilities. The author of the analogy must argue that the similarities between the two objects of comparison are more important, legally and ethically speaking, than the differences between them. Such an argument will never be completely free of uncertainty, simply because analogy will always fall short of demonstrable proof. To adopt Newman's terminology, an analogy will be deemed persuasive largely to the extent that its intended audience accepted the interpretive assumptions upon which it is tacitly based, yet the validity of those assumptions may remain irremediably controversial. For this reason, the texts tell us not to rely upon analogy as a basis for halakhic decision when other, more authoritative sources of the law(books;®’ the advice of a competent scholar) are available.

Ill. Analogy in Contemporary Halakhah: The Treatment of the Terminally Ill. Analogy, therefore, is accorded a decidedly mixed reception in the Jewish legal tradition. As in law and ethics, analogy is a“necessary and ubiquitous” tool in halakhic thought. Without it, rabbis from talmudic times onward would have been unable to derive knowledge of the law in new and unprecedented matters and cases. If anything, analogy is even more important in Jewish law than in other legal traditions. Given the absence of a universally recognized