Woodchopper Revisited 21
Rabbi Moshe Isserles pursues the theme in his gloss to this passage: Similarly, it is forbidden to hasten the death of the dying person. For example, in the case of one who has been a goses for an extended period of time and is unable to die [literally,“whose soul is unable to separate from his body”], it is forbidden to move the pillows and mattress from beneath him, which is done because some people believe that the feathers of certain birds hinder the person’s death. Likewise, it is forbidden to move him from his place or to place the keys of the synagogue underneath his head in order that his soul might depart.
On the other hand, he continues:
If there is present any factor which prevents the soul from departing, such as the sound of a woodcutter near the house or salt on the patient's tongue...it is permitted to remove that factor. This is not considered an act of commission(maaseh) but merely the removal of an impediment.
Herein, according to the Jewish ethicists whom Newman critiques, lies a major Jewish textual warrant both for the distinction between killing the terminally ill patient and letting that person die as well as for the permit to withdraw or discontinue lifesustaining therapies regarded as medically futile. The respirator is analogized to the woodchopper and to the salt: if the latter may be removed, so, too, may we disconnect the former.
The second text is the narrative in B. Ketubot 104a concerning the death of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi (“Rabbi,” Judah the Prince ). Rabbi ’s students have gathered at their dying teacher’s bedside to pray for his life. Their prayers have the effect of keeping him alive, but they cannot bring about his recovery. Rabbi ’s maidservant climbs to the attic and adds her prayer to theirs, but when she sees that Rabbi is