32 Mark Washofsky

nothing but extend the patient’s life in its present state. In saying this, Feinstein is careful to affirm the traditional Jewish teachings concerning the value of even the shortest span of human life. Thus, only“passive” actions(the removal of an impediment) are permitted, “since to initiate any action that will shorten life by even a moment is considered bloodshed.” A near-death patient must be given oxygen, “because to do so will ease his suffering.” When the oxygen in the tank runs out, however, the physicians may examine the patient to see whether he has died.“In this way, there is no concern that the doctors will kill the patient... even by depriving him of the briefest moment of life(cahyei sha’ah haketzarah beyoter).”

Feinstein’s ruling stirred some further questions, to which he addressed himself two years later in a teshuvah to R. Sholom Tendler.” In this second missive he restates his opinion that doctors should not administer therapy that cannot offer recovery to the terminal patient and that promises only to extend his life in its present condition of suffering. He once again cites B. Ketubot 104a, along with R. Nissim’s commentary, but this time he emphasizes not the maidservant’s prayer but the action she took to interrupt the prayers of Rabbi ’s students. This marks a significant shift from his earlier teshuvah, in which he stressed the lesson that just as the maidservant prayed for Rabbi to die,“there are times when we must pray for the death” of the terminal patient. Feinstein now rejects the analogy from the maidservant’s prayer to our own:“our prayers today are not so readily accepted, so we should not learn from the ineffectiveness of our prayers for the patient’s recovery that it is permissible to pray for his death, God forbid.” The analogy that does work, however, is the analogy of the maidservant’s interruption of the prayers and the withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment that merely extends pain and suffering but offers no hope for recovery. Yet while Feinstein reasserts his support for the discontinuation of futile treatments, he introduces here two limitations on his otherwise permissive ruling. First, he declares that the patient must be kept alive,