38 Mark Washofsky in that it offers a reason for a decision but does not necessitate that decision. Principles do not require that judges decide cases in a particular way, because there may be other principles in the law that would support a different outcome. The judge in each case must first determine whether a principle applies and then weigh the relative importance of that principle against other principles that would argue for a different outcome. Take, for example, the well-known American case Riggs v. Palmer,” in which the court ruled that a man named as the heir in his grandfather’s will could not inherit under that will because he had murdered his grandfather in order to do so. The court defended its ruling on the basis of the principle that“no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.” While this was certainly a good reason on which to found the decision, it did not obligate the court to reach that finding. Other principles, such as the need to establish a clear title, or to enforce the stated will of the testator, or to refrain from inflicting punishments beyond those stipulated by the legislature, argued in favor of the opposite decision. An example of conflicting principles in Jewish law can be discerned in halakhic practice with respect to the agunah, the woman unable to remarry due to her husband’s disappearance or his inability or refusal to grant her a divorce. On the one hand, the sources enunciate the principle that it is a mitzvah to search for every possible leniency in the law in order to release the unfortunate agunah from her plight. On the other hand, the serious consequences that would result if a legally married woman were permitted to remarry she would be committing adultery, and her children by her subsequent husband would be mamzerim induce many authorities to invoke a competing principle, namely that a posek must assume a posture of conservatism and caution in matters of marital status and not support a leniency unless he is absolutely sure it is warranted by settled halakhah.” Here, too, valid principles can be invoked by the legal authority to support two very different rulings on the case in question. The judge will have to choose between them, and this choice may depend as much if not

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