PETER HAAS

from approved witnesses and then issues a ruling in line with accepted practice and custom. It thus comes as no surprise that the early rabbinic literature makes no distinction between setting up a beit din and setting up a court to handle an arbitration, since the two procedures are in fact identical. The identification of these two court systems in the minds of the Tannaim is clear from the Mishnah, ? which discusses the makeup of the court, but which is also the locus classicus for the arbitration board. It describes the procedure as follows:

"Property cases are[decided by] three[judges].‘This litigant chooses one[judge], and that litigant chooses one judge, and then the two of the[litigants] choose one more,” the words of R. Meir. And the sages say,‘The two judges choose one more.”

What we have here is a normal three-judge panel, of the type that adjudicates all civil disputes in Judaism . The arbitration is conceived as no different from any other court case. The only apparent difference is that an arbitration panel is not a sitting court, but is appointed by the litigants on an ad hoc basis. In this way the arbitration panel is different from the Sanhedrin which was presumably a permanent body made up of scholars.

The more informal nature of the arbitration panel raises immediately the practical question of how its members are to be chosen. Can anyone serve on such a panel or are there some qualifications or limitations? The Mishnah * seems to assume that anyone can serve if appointed. The question is addressed more directly in the same Mishnah , which describes the grounds for dismissing a proposed panel member:

"This party has the right to invalidate the judge chosen by that one, and that party has the right to invalidate the judge chosen by this one, the words of R. Meir. And sages say,‘Under what circumstances? When he brings evidence about them, that they are

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