PETER HAAS

"R. Judah b. Korha says: Settlement by arbitration is a meritorious act, for it is written:‘Render judgement of truth and peace in your gates.” Surely where there is strict justice there is no peace, and where there is no peace, there is no strict justice! But what is that kind of justice with which peace abides?-- We must say: arbitration."

For the Babylonians, then, arbitration, rather than being a legal fiction for avoiding court trials, turns out to be a preferable mode of solving disputes. The reason is, of course, that both sides concur in the settlement and so will be willing to see matters through in good faith. In fact, I think it is fair to say that the framers of the Talmud not only preferred arbitration to full-blown legal action, but actually were prepared to say that arbitration had stronger legal warrants than an imposed settlement:

'R. Simeon b. Gamaliel says: Legal judgement is by three; arbitration is valid if made by two. And the force of arbitration is greater than that of legal judgement, for if two judges decide a case, the litigants can repudiate their decision, but if two judges arbitrate, the parties cannot repudiate their decision."

Despite its possible origin as an extra-legal institution, then, it is clear that arbitration courts quickly became a recognized and even honored element of Jewish communal structure. As such, these courts continued to function throughout the Middle Ages. Gulak, for example, has collected number of“arbitration documents.”® These give us a good idea of how the procedure worked. Responsa from the Middle Ages also indicate the procedure was given full legal recognition. At times, arbiters were deemed equivalent in all respects to regular judges.'* A few differences did persist however. In some cases the case brought to arbitration had to be argued with 24 hours. Rules of evidence

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