life, from the veneration of ancestral practice, or from a heritage (especially in Ashkenaz ) of customary ritual observances which exist alongside of and do not owe their origin to the formal halakhah of texts and Talmud . Minhagim are authoritative not because scholars derive them but because the people observe them, and the people will most likely resent attempts by scholar-rabbis, through their sharp and ingenious textual gymnastics, to prove that the custom
It is hardly surprising, then, that the religious life of the Jews in all its complexity has produced numerous minhagim which conflict with and are alien to the rational structure of halakhic theory. Our three examples are cases in point. From the standpoint of logic, Hallel should not be recited on Rosh Hodesh, a day on which no salvation was wrought for Israel . The recitation of a berakhah over a customary Or voluntary observance violates both the theory and the language of this liturgical form. By all textual indications and the rules of halakhic decision the evening Shema ought not to be recited before sundown. And the relevant Talmudic passages seem to bear out the interpretations of the great rishonim: A kohen either may or must allow a Torah scholar to precede him to the Torah . Minhag, however, is not the product of the rational analysis of formal rules and principles. It springs from what Jacob Katz calls the"ritual instinct" of the people rather than from logical analysis of text.” These minhagim have attained power and permanence because they genuinely reflect this instinct: the desire to raise the status of a voluntary act to that of mitzvah; the desire to pray together as a community even though that gathering can take place only before nightfall; and the desire to render honor to the kohanim. The service of these religious impulses led to the creation of ritual practices which violate the formal halakhah.
When halakhic authorities confront such a minhag, they may assume a variety of postures. They may declare it to be a minhag
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