DANIEL SCHIFF
Rabbi Jacob, in making a choice between what he regards as two undesirable options, favors allowing for rabbinic officiation at the marriage of the adulterous couple in preference to the specter of the couple living together. Indeed, Rabbi Jacob views the mere possibility that“they may simply opt to live together” as enough of a threat to the“general attitude towards family life” to make rabbinic officiation worthwhile. Rabbi Jacob does not explain, however, how rabbinic officiation at the marriage of a couple that has committed adultery might serve the interests of this“general attitude towards family life,” beyond displaying a clear commitment to the institution of marriage. One could, of course, argue that in a climate in which marriage is still widely seen as a desideratum, requiring such a couple to live together, rather than consenting to their marriage, might be an eloquent articulation of society’s disapproval of their prior desecration of family life. Is it not
conceivable that—in support of family life—Jewish society could express its thorough disapproval of couples living together and could make this disapproval crystal clear by depicting living together as the only available choice of those who have engaged in undesirable behavior?
Moreover, even if Rabbi Jacob is correct, and it is in fact more desirable for such a couple to regularize their relationship through marriage, this does not at all necessitate a rabbi or Judaism being involved. Civil marriage is certainly a possibility that, having been extensively discussed in the traditional responsa over the last several centuries, is an accepted category within Jewish law. *' Indeed, given the circumstances of a couple that has committed classic adultery, civil marriage might be said to possess the double attraction of providing a societally recognized formalization of their status while yet according the relationship no Jewish standing. If the
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