SEPARATING THE ADULT FROM ADULTERY
Rabbi Jacob is clearly of the view that, when the facts of adultery are not in dispute, it is proper that here, in fact, be some public consequences for adulterous acts. He regards the incongruity inherent in the instance of an adulterer who unrepentantly transgresses the Torah being called to recite blessings over the Torah as being beyond problematic. Transgressions of such dimensions, Rabbi Jacob conveys, call forth proportionate sanctions in return.
Indeed, though Rabbi Jacob does not address the issue, it is worth considering the implications of not employing such sanctions. For, insofar as Reform Judaism allows substantial public penalties like exclusion from aliyot or removal from office to be applied to pecuniary impropriety but not to adultery, the unavoidable message sent to the community must be that progressive halakhic thinking regards financial theft as far more serious than covenental betrayal.” If, then, progressive Judaism continues to regard adultery with the gravity that—since 1869—it has never disavowed, the question becomes rather: How could such penalties not be used for cases of proven adultery? If these penalties are used in other circumstances—but not for adultery—the potential adulterer could easily conclude that, having dismantled all previous penalties without enacting any replacements, progressive Judaism is now less than resolute in its opposition to adultery. Conversely, by using some of the sanctions at its disposal to deal with classic adultery, progressive Judaism would convey the significant idea that adultery remains one of the weightiest transgressions a Jew can commit and that, consequently, it may not be dismissed lightly.
The prospect of sanctions, of course, immediately raises numerous questions related to due process and justice: Would witnesses be required to attest to the reality of the adultery? If so, how
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