MARK WASHOFSKY

"civil" as opposed to"religious" matter, is problematic, as such a distinction is arguably foreign to Jewish law. Still, the issue is one of persuasion: what makes the decision halakhically"wrong" is not that the legal sources flatly deny the validity of civil divorce but that to prove otherwise requires a reading of the sources which does not persuade most readers.

117. A halakhic community which regards religious divorce as a legal necessity would also recognize the potential validity of various solutions proposed to ease the burden on the wife whose husband unconscionably refuses to issue her a get. These proposals are backed by halakhic argumentation that many responsible scholars find persuasive. But they are judged"invalid" in orthodox circles for the simple fact that they run counter to the consensus opinion among the gedolim. See Mark Washofsky, "The Recalcitrant Husband: The Problem of Definition," Jewish Law Annual, Vol. 4, 1981, pp. 144­166, and"The Search for a Liberal Halakhah," p. 34. The conversational model would not accept "consensus" as an automatic indication of the invalidity of a serious halakhic proposal.

118. The question"who makes the abortion decision?", though a serious one, is irrelevant to the point here. We are talking about the halakhic-moral criteria that ought to inform the decision regardless of who--the woman herself; a communal authority; a combination of the two--ultimately makes it.

119. Was it good or bad, on balance, that mankind was created? See Eruvin 13b and commentaries.

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