ways of keeping babies with very serious problems alive, frequently in a vegetative state, which brings great misery to the family involved. Such problems, as those caused by Tay Sachs and other degenerative or permanent conditions which seriously endanger the life of the child and potentially the mental health of the mother, are indications for permitting an abortion.
We agree with the traditional authorities that abortions should be approached cautiously throughout the life of the fetus. Most authorities would be least hesitant during the first forty days of the fetus’ life(Yeb. 69b; Nid. 30b; M. Ker. 1.1, Shulhan Arukh Hoshen Mishpat 210.2; Solomon Skola, Bet Shelomo, Hoshen Mishpat 132; Joseph Trani , Responsa Maharit, 1.99; Weinberg, Noam, 9, pp. 213 ff, etc.) Even the strict Unterman permits non-Jews to perform abortions within the forty day periods(Unterman, op. cit., pp. 8 ff).
From forty days until twenty-seven weeks, the fetus possesses some status, but its future remains doubtful(goses biydei adam; San. 78a; Nid. 44b and commentaries) as we are not sure of its viability. We must,
therefore, be more certain of our grounds for abortion, but would still permit it.
It is clear from all of this that traditional authorities would be most lenient with abortions within the first forty days. After that time, there is a difference of opinion. Those who are within the broadest range of permissibility permit abortion at any time before birth, if there is a serious danger to the health of the mother or the child. We would be in agreement with that liberal stance. We do not encourage abortion, nor favor it for trivial reasons, or sanction it"on demand."