HALAKHAH AND ULTERIOR MOTIVES

reasoning is meant to justify not his own decisions but those of other rabbis.” Consider that these responsa were directed to rabbis in small communities(the"outskirts of Pittsburgh" and Canton, Ohio, respectively) at a time(1952 and 1950) when American Orthodoxy, not having entered its current self-confident triumphalist phase, was struggling for survival. For their own professional survival, Orthodox rabbis frequently found it necessary to compromise their standards of observance in the face of community pressure. An outright condemnation of conversion for the sake of marriage, in the style of Rav Kook, would correspond to the"true", ideal halakhah, but it would place these rabbis and others like them in the unenviable position of having to deviate from normative Judaism in order to officiate, as they must, at such conversions. Feinstein elects a middle path. He recognizes on the one hand the correct theory of the law which forbids these conversions and regards them as invalid should they take place.” On the other hand, by straining to create his alternative theories, he allows these rabbis to maintain at least the appearance of halakhic integrity while taking actions which are forced upon them.

Like Herzog, Feinstein’s alternative theory approach permits him a degree of legal flexibility that serves an important, practical purpose. We should, however, take note of the difference between these two authorities. Herzog’s alternative theory is based upon an existing line of rabbinic precedents, decisions of respectable posqim whose prestige is unquestioned even though one may disagree with them. Feinstein, by contrast, seems not to accept these precedents at all and so must create his alternative theories out of thin air. The theories are thus excessively weak, and Feinstein himself shows them little respect. For him, this is not a case of legitimate halakhic mahloget, an issue over which reasonable rabbinic scholars can disagree. The permissive position is in fact wrong, unreasonable, and exists only to provide halakhic cover for rabbis who in their hearts know better. It functions as Feinstein’s version of the"lesser­of-two-evils" policy argument: it is better for rabbis to justify their

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