MARK WASHOVSKY

decisions by means of patently weak halakhic argumentation than to deviate openly from the law. Like all policy arguments, this one can be challenged on the basis of the facts. Perhaps the opposite is true: resort to such halakhic sleight-of-hand may be the surest way to destroy the respect of the laity for the Jewish legal system. The point, however, is not whether or not Feinstein’s policy judgement is correct but rather that he makes it. It is an act of his discretion, a choice which he makes to serve a purpose other than the determination of what, strictly speaking, is the authoritative halakhah in this case.

V. Benzion Uziel: A Return to Pragmatism

Feinstein’s approach can be termed"pragmatic”, although in a backhanded sort of way: his judgement of practical necessity leads him to devise a legal theory not to account for his own, presumably correct ruling but rather the incorrect rulings of other rabbis. A clearer example of halakhic pragmatism can be found in the opinions of R. Benzion Meir Hai Uziel, who served as the first Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel until his death in 1953. One decision, dating from his years as rabbi in Salonica , is especially interesting. Uziel permits the non-Jewish wife of a Jewish man (and, importantly, the mother of his children) to convert and marry him according to halakhah. In his responsum,’”” he cites the sources which prohibit conversion when undertaken for an ulterior motive, along with the gloss declaring that"the entire matter is left to the judgement of the court".”” He suggests that in this case, discretion argues for permitting the conversion and marriage, on the grounds that

"(the wife) will be drawn ever closer to her husband's family and religion. Moreover, her present and future children will be fully Jewish (yehudim gemurim). This is analogous to the cases of Hillel and R. Hiyya, who were certain that their converts would eventually become true proselytes. It is

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