vation is to portray himself as protecting an infinitely fragile system in which the slightest change may provoke an avalanche that inundates the tradition. Hence, even justifiable changes, such as reading Megillah in the vernacular to women who do not speak Hebrew or allowing daughters to recite gaddish, must be viewed in terms of the larger danger they pose.” The argument, ironically, calls for a broader concept of legal relevance. Schachter wants the effect on the entire system to be considered over and above the merits of the particular case. But whereas feminist jurisprudence seeks an extended definition of legal relevance to admit more data about the actual circumstances and concerns of women into the legal process, Schachter’s concern is the protection of the system, even at the cost of injuring those whom it disadvantages.
Schachter’s most astonishing piece of legal evidence that nothing may be changed is an absolutized and decontextualized citation from one of the most celebrated modernist authorities, R. Yehiel Yaakov Weinberg. Weinberg rules that an infant may not be anesthetized for circumcision because it is contrary to Jewish practice. A more apposite Weinberg responsum Schachter does not quote permits women to participate in mixed singing in Jew ish youth groups.® In that responsum Weinberg gives priority to the context that demands such a ruling. He also observes that women accustomed to joining in would feel hurt by their exclusion, a consideration Schachter never raises in his halakhic decisionmaking. In this section, Schachter presents an idealized revisionist account of minhag that conflates custom and law and defines both as enactments handed down by an authoritative elite. A special power is attributed to communal minhag, from which it is forbidden to deviate. Not only is it forbidden to deviate from present local custom, Schachter argues, but from the customs of all the communities of the past. Given the temporal and cultural range of Jewish communities, it is impossible to imagine how anyone could fulfill such an obligation.
Arguments Regarding Imitation of Non-Jews
In the final section of the responsum, Schachter charges that the customs of the prayer groups are unacceptable because they are