13.
14.
16.
17.
Narrative and contextuality are also distinguishing themes of ¢ ritical legal studies. See Roberto Mangabeira Unger , Passion: An Essay on Personality, New York , 1984, 5-15.
For an extended discussion of Jewish law, see Rachel Adler , Engendering Judaism: An Inclusive Theology and Ethics, Philadelphia , 1998, 37-44. For specific articles regarding secular jurisprudence, see: Kenneth Karst ,“A Woman's Constitution,” Duke Law Journal, no. 3(1984): 447-508, especially 499-500, and Robin J. West,“Jurisprudence and Gender” University of Chicago Law Review 55(Winter 1988): 1-71.
Robin J. West,“The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory,” in At the Boundaries of Law: Feminism and Legal Theory, Martha Albertson Fineman and Nancy Sweet Thomadsen, eds., New York , 1991, 115-34.
Seyla Benhabib ,“The Generalized and Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory,” Women and Moral Theory, Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers , eds., Totowa, NJ , 1987, 154-177. Another version of this essay can be found in Seyla Benhabib , Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics, New York , 1992, 148-177. Martha Minow ,“The Supreme Court 1986 Term: Forward: Justice Engendered,” Harvard Law Review 101, no. 4, November 1987, especially 31-70. Martha Minow , Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law, Ithaca , N.Y. and London , 1990.
Jean Bethke Elshtain ,“Feminist Discourse and Its Discontents: Language, Power, and Meaning,” in Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology, Nannerl O. Keohane , Michelle A. Rosaldo and Barbara Gelpi, eds., Chicago, 1982, 12745. See also Robin J. West,“Authority, Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Pos ner, ” Harvard Law Review 99(December 1985): 384-428.
These concerns distinguishing Jewish feminism from other religious feminisms are noted by Carol P. Christ and Judith Plaskow , eds., WomanSpirit Rising, New York , 1979, 134.
On this issue see the articles of Paula Hyman , Esther Ticktin, and Saul Berman in The Jewish Woman: New Perspectives, Elizabeth Koltun, ed., New York , 1976, as well as the articles of Rachel Adler , Blu Greenberg , Cynthia Ozick and Judith Plaskow in On Being a Jewish Feminist, Susannah Heschel , ed., New York , 1983, and Blu Greenberg , On Women and Judaism: a View From Tradition, Philadelphia , 1981.
Rachel Adler ,“The Jew Who Wasn't There: Halakhah and the Jewish Woman” Davka(Summer, 1971), reprinted in On Being a Jewish Feminist, 12-18.
Blu Greenberg , On Women and Judaism, 33.
Weiss, Women at Prayer, 110-111n. In note 38, Weiss summarizes the argument of this responsum. Goren relates the question of whether women may say devarim she-be-gedusha to the right to recite berakhot on commandments from which one is legally exempt. In other instances, Ashkenazic practice on this matter follows Rabbenu Tam , who permits women to recite blessings on positive time-bound commandments such as holiday observances, and, indicates that this was the communal practice in his time. Goren reaffirmed this opinion in a conversation with Weiss in Spring 1989, but in a letter to the Sefardic