gogue that has been egalitarian for some twenty years, I, for one, am sorely tempted to read such texts in that way, but I must be honest in pointing out that would be playing fast and loose with the plain meaning of the text when it is read, as it should be, in its historical context.

The same argument applies to solitary texts that seem to report that in some places women actually did what we do not want to allow them to do. The medieval text used to indicate that even in those times women could be counted for a prayer quorum minyan is a good example of this. It is a comment of the Mordecai(thirteenth century), who, in turn, is reporting what he “found” in the writings of an earlier Rabbi Simhah, possibly the compiler of the Mahzor Vitri."? Even if such texts are to be cred­ited, and even if they mean what we take them to mean, we surely must admit that they represent exceptions to the rule, that the overwhelming practice in the synagogues of our mediev al and early modern ancestors was to permit only men to count for the quorum and to lead the services. To say otherwise is simply

not being honest.

The Nature of Custom

The fact that custom determined the role of women in synagogue services, in witnessing, and in marriage and divorce means, for me, that if we are going to be true to that historical precedent, we must give custom a much larger role in determining our own practices as well. To stick to specific formulations of what was

communal custom in these matters as if they were determined

by legal analysis in the first place is, in my view, to ignore history in an excessive exercise of legal formalism.

Custom, however, is a slippery animal. Customs are not established at a specific time and place by recognized rabbinic authorities. Many times, in fact, customs are not even acknowl edged by the rabbis, let alone validated by them. Because cus” toms are not clearly stated in a rabbinic ruling, others, especially those living at a different time and place, often cannot under stand its scope. The very genre of custom, coming as it does as a“fact on the ground” rather than a proposal to be considered