MARK WASHOFSKY

moment, we can maintain more than one plausible, arguably“cor­rect” interpretation of the sources. Were it otherwise, were the answers to these questions truly obvious or self-evident, they would not have been submitted to the responsa process, to the judgment of the great poskim, the“appellate” jurisdiction of Jewish law, whose task it is to weigh the available alternative answers and to determine which one represents the best and most convincing understanding of the sources of Jewish law.

This is why most rabbinic responsa, like the Talmud itself, are written in a discursive style, a manner of speaking and writing that by its nature concedes that the law is not a one-sided phenome­non. The tone of such a responsum is not declarative but argumen­tative. It does not merely state its conclusion; it justifies it, making a case for the posek’s answer and against others that might be of­fered. It does not demand that we accept its ruling as a pronounce­ment ex cathedra, of oracular fact. Concerned as much about the “why” of the Halakhah as it is about the“what,” it asks us to em­bark on an intellectual journey whose path is marked by the author’s reasoning and whose destination is the pesak. It invites us not only to agree with that conclusion, but to think and to talk about the Halakhah in a particular way rather than in other ways. It suggests reasons why we should understand the Halakhah and our perception of our Jewish roles and responsibilities in the manner that this author understands and perceives them. In so doing, it allows us to participate in the discussion, the debate, the age-old shakla vetarya (dialectic) by which the rabbinic mind has sought to discern the will of God . This style, which we might designate the way of conversation, represents Halakhah not so much as an exercise of authority, but as a conversation, a process of thinking and talking and imagining ourselves as Jews .

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