IS OLD AGE A DISEASE?
which, though it may be associated with infirmity and pain, is not to be treated as a medical objective, as an enemy to be liquidated.
Do we really mean to invite the conclusion that a person's advanced age is by itself a sufficient reason to withhold treatment from him or her, especially if that treatment involves any kind of substantial expenditure? Although some voices in our society call for precisely that kind of allocation scheme, it can well be criticized as the exacting of a mortal penalty upon an entire class of persons whose only crime is that they have remained alive. By this thinking an elderly person that does not suffer from any“incurable disease” other than age has a right to enjoy the remainder of his or her life that is in every way equal to the right enjoyed by a younger person. The criterion of medical efficacy, in other words, is a valuable tool in making our allocation decisions, but its application arguably should be restricted to objectives that are clearly medical, that
involve the struggle against disease, rather than to those associated only with advanced age.
Likewise, were we to begin our thinking from the standpoint of the third criterion, that of qualitative evaluation, we might find ourselves morally permitted to inquire as to our vision of the good society, the model according to which we might determine our lifesaving priorities. That vision of an ideal community may well require that we grant precedence to the health and welfare of our children, the generation of the future, over that of a generation whose capacity to shape the future is severely limited. Once again, however, this choice is by no means certain. Our notion of a“good society” might just as persuasively demand that we set no limits to the honor and compassion we bestow on our aged, and Jewish tradition would surely offer much support to this view. If the issue
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