IS OLD AGE A DISEASE?
rabbinic interpretation, extends to the saving of life(B. Sanhedrin 73a; Rambam , Commentary to M, Nedarim 4:4).
12. For a Reform halakhic perspective, see our responsa 5754.14 and 5754.18 to be published in the forthcoming volume of feshuvot from the CCAR Responsa Committee, 1990-1995.
13. The prohibition is based on M. Bava Kama 8:5; see Yad, Hil. Chovel 5:1 and SA CM 420:31.
14. See Yad, Hil. Yesodey Hatorah 5:1-2 and SA YD 157:1.
1S, In the Talmud ’s version of this passage, Ben Petura cites no biblical proof text for his position. This implies that his reasoning is based on sevara(logic; common sense; perhaps a kind of practical reasoning familiar in legal contexts). This, indeed, is suggested elsewhere by Feinstein himself(Resp. Igerot Moshe YD 1:145), who links this case with the passage in B. Sanhedrin 74, where the prohibition against saving one’s life by committing murder is derived by means of sevara. In Ben Petura’s view, according to Feinstein, the traveler that holds the water has an obligation under the laws of 1zedakah to aid his fellow. Refusal to let him share the water is therefore not an omission (shev ve’al ta’aseh) but a commission, the act of refraining from performing a positive commandment (bitul’aseh), the active removal of the life-sustaining resource: hence, it is tantamount to murder Since the rule of B. Sanhedrin 74a.equires the traveler to assume a passive stance and not take any action(ma’aseh) that favors one life over another, his only moral recourse is to share the water
All this changes, of course, if we follow the version of this passage found in the Sifra to Lev. 25:36. There, Ben Petura and R. Akiva both derive their positions from a midrashic interpretation of the verse; neither relies in a formal sense upon sevara at all, a fact that takes this entire problem out of the realm of“plain” moral argument. The halakhic supremacy of the Babylonian Talmud means that the Bava Meizi’a version is the one more familiar to subsequent rabbinic discussion.
16. Alfasi cites the passage(Bava Metzia, fol. 34a), and R. Asher exnlains that R. Akiva ’s interpretation of Lev. 25:36 retains halakhic force even though the verse as a whole is used for other purposes(Hil. Harosh, Bava Meizia 5:6). See also R. Nissim Gerondi to B. Nedarim 80b, s.V. ma’ayan shel beney ha’ir, who refers to the Bava Merzia passage on the assumption that the Halakhah follows R. Akiva . And, finally, see Feinstein himself(Resp. Igerot Moshe, YD 1:145), who explains that Maimonides also regards R. Akiva ’s position as authoritative even though he does not mention it in the Mishneh Torah.
17, Rashi, B. Sanhedrin 74a, s.v. sevara hu and mai chazit.
18. This assumes, of course, that by keeping the water, one is not in some way committing 4 positive act; to do nothing, we might say, is also to make a choice. And see the much-discussed comment of R. Hayyim Soloveitchik, Chidushey R. Chaim Halevy’al Harambam, Yesodey Torah 5:1, who suggests that in Maimonides ” view one is forbidden in all cases from saving one’s own life at the cost of another’s, even if that other person dies as a result of one’s passivity or failure to act. This would mean that to refuse to share the water is to commit murder(essentially Feinstein’s
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