vorce to a case where the wife is not terminally ill(Ran to Alfasi, Ket. 19a); Solomon Luria argues that in our day, when the takanah of R. Gershom forbids divorce without the wife's consent, the husband can not compel her to choose between these alternatives (Joel Sirkes to Tur Even Haezer 79). At any rate, whether a spouse possesses this right or not, it is definitely not in keeping with the spirit of marriage and its sanctity.
Just as the wife has the obligation to provide medical care for the husband, the husband is also obligated to provide economic sustenance to his wife. This is a tenai bet din(Yad Hil. Ishut 12.2 ff). The wife has the right to renounce this support; if she does, her husband no longer has any claim to her income. The wife in this instance could be encouraged to establish herself in a state of financial independence; under Jewish law she need not be divorced in order to gain control of her own finances(Ketubot 58b; Yad Hil. | Ishut 12.4). In addition, the bet din is empowered to seize the | husband’s property in the event of his mental incapacity in order | to fulfill her requirement of mezonot(Ibid., 12.17). In this case, the husband's“property” would include the ketubah or its equivalent; under Jewish law the husband's estate is mortgaged in order to provide the required support for the wife. This also means that his children as his heirs are obligated to support his wife; this is not charity, but a debt which is owed her. These thoughts help us within the framework of halakhah, but not with the current requirement of American law.
We must balance these statements with our general view of kiddushim and see it in the light of this particular couple. There is nothing in the question which indicates that they have become estranged from each other. Only this debilitating illness has led to
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