26 Mark Washofsky

the whole house of Israel : Alfasi, Rambam , and R. Asher b. Yechiel.” He will follow that view except in those cases where the preponderance of halakhic opinion and practice diverges from it. In the event that a majority decision cannot be derived from among the“big three” poskim—for example, should one of them not refer to a certain matter while the other two are in dis­pute over it—Karo will resort to a second tier of authorities, deciding the law according to the majority view among Nach­ manides , R. Shelomo b. Adret, R. Nissim Gerondi, the Sefer Hamordekhai, and the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol.

This“mathematical” method for determining the law was not without its critics.” Still, its existence demonstrates that the tendency toward binding precedent, to declare the halakhah in accordance with the opinions of particular post-Talmudic sages, was advocated by a halakhist of towering reputation. And he by no means was the innovator of this method of decision. Sefardic and“Oriental” Jewish communities had followed such a rule for centuries, adopting either by an act of communal legislation (takanah) or by general custom(minhag) the practice of establish­ing one or more outstanding halakhic works as the supreme legal authority.” Maimonides especially wore the title of supreme authority(mara de’atra) in Egypt , the land of Israel , and in many other localities, a fact that Karo himself recognizes as a virtually universal custom in his region” and which goes far in explaining the tendenz of his own Shulhan Arukh.”” The custom in some Sefardic communities was to decide the halakhah in accordance with the opinion of R. Asher b. Yechiel. This is another of the ironies of halakhic history, since R. Asher himself opposed such an“automatic” approach to legal decision-making.'® Yet it, like those tendencies in favor of Rambam , Alfasi, Nachmanides and others, reflected a disposition in Sefardic halakhic thought to defer in legal decision to the judgment of the great rishonim, the authorities of the distant past, even when one’s own reasoning would lead to a different conclusion.'”! The acceptance of binding precedent thus has a long and honored history among the legal practitioners of a large segment of the Jewish community.

A similar custom emerged among the Jews in Ashkenazic lands during that period. R. Moshe Isserles(d. 1572), whose Darkhey Moshe commentary on the Tur paralleled the Beit Yosef, posited that the law should be decided according to“the latest authorities”(hilkheta kevatra’ey). This decision-making rule has a