46 Mark Washofsky

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three parts. First, Rivash recites the“halakhic consensus,” the Talmudic sources and the precedents that so clearly prohibit the proposed marriage of Shmuel Aramah. While this would seem to be an obvious requirement of the responsa-writer, this section serves the vital rhetorical purpose of reinforcing Rivash ’s“ethi­cal” appeal as a scholar of probity and integrity, one who knows the law and refuses to overlook it even though it weighs against his preferred solution.'*? Second, he portrays the legal reality, noting that Jewish courts have long refused on pragmatic grounds to enforce this and similar rules. This allows him to cre­ate in the minds of his readers a difficult dilemma between law and good legal practice. On the one hand, the“law” as consti­tuted in the precedents prohibits the marriage, and responsible Jewish communal leaders are expected to follow the dictates of Torah and halakhah. On the other hand, responsible Jewish com­munal leaders surely wish to avoid the legal chaos and the inequities that Rivash predicts would result from an attempt to enforce the law in this instance. His readers, in other words, are expected to be torn in both directions. Loyal to both the law and to the proper functioning of their institutions of government, they will no doubt want a solution that does justice to each of these ends. Rivash provides it in the third part of his argument, in which he identifies an alternative precedent to govern the case. This, of course, is the most problematic element of his teshu­vah: how does one establish a“new” precedent when the con­trolling halakhah is so clear and firm? The answer is two-fold. It is based, first of all, upon the logic of analogy. Rav Nachman'’s rul­ing has already determined that a woman is entitled to a“staff” and a“hoe” during her old age, and though his decision referred specifically to children as this source of future support, it is not implausible that Rav Nachman would include a husband under this rubric, particularly for a woman beyond childbearing years. Secondly, Rivash uses Rav Nachman'’s ruling to redefine the rel­evant legal situation at hand. The case is not truly“about” the male’s obligation to procreate but“about” the needs of an elderly woman and, to a lesser extent, a man who seeks financial security. His sympathetic portrayal of both Shmuel Aramah and his intended bride create an alternative narrative structure'® around the facts. The reader is now asked to judge the situation from the quite personal vantage point of two human beings who seek not to evade the law but to build lives of personal and

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