Mark Washofsky

68. 69.

70.

71.

. Eliav Shochetman,“Chovat hahanmakah bamishpat haivri, 59. 60. 61. 62.

63.

64.

65.

66. 67.

. Llewellyn,“Remarks,” 395. . Zerach Warhaftig ,“Hatakdim bamishpat ha‘ivri,” Shenaton Hamishpat

Ha'ivri 6-7(1979-1980) 105, 119-120.

” Shenaton Hamishpat Ha ivri 6-7(1979-1980) 321, 395.

On this rule(ein lo ladayan ela mah she einav ro’ot), see below.

Elon, Jewish Law , 983-985.

Yaakov Canaani, Otzar halashon ha’ivrit(Givatayim : Massada, 1989), credits the invention to Itamar Ben-Avi (d. 1942).

Although there have been various bumps along this road. For the history of the doctrine of binding precedent in Israeli law, see Warhaftig , 109-113.

The emphasis here is on the word“generally”; the Talmud and the halakhic literature require the judge to respond positively to the litigant’s request for a written record“of the legal basis upon which you rendered my judgment (me’eizeh ta’ am dantuni).” See BT Sanhedrin 31b and Yad, Sanhedrin 6:6.

See Shochetman, 326-332. See also Hanina Ben-Menahem , Judicial Deviation in Talmudic Law (New York : Harwood, 1991), 19-40.

Decisions of Jewish courts are not to be reviewed by other courts, let alone “higher” tribunals exercising supervisory power;“no court may critique the ruling of another court”(BT Bava Batra 138b). The creation of a rabbinic appellate court(beit din hagadol la’er*urim) in 1921 is generally recognized as an innovation in Jewish law, brought on at the behest of the British manda­tory authorities, whose own legal system, of course, is familiar with both the doctrine of binding precedent and the institution of appellate courts. See Elon, 824-825 and 1809-1818, as well as Shochetman, 355-356. On the other hand, two authors made notable attempts to demonstrate that an appellate jurisdiction is not inconsistent with Jewish law. Simcha Asaf, Batey din vesidreyhen acharey chatimat hatalmud(Jerusalem : Defus Hapo'alim, 1924) bases his argument upon historical examples, while R. Benzion Ouziel (Resp. Mishpetey ouziel 3, CM 1) utilizes traditional(though creative) halak­hic reasoning.

Shochetman, 326.

Rashbam , BT Bava Batra 130b, s.v. velo mipi ma’aseh. See also YT Chagigah 1:8 (7b) and Korban Ha’ eidah, s.v. she’ein lemedin min hama aseh:“for example, when one sees his rabbi issuing a ruling, one should not declare the halakhah thusly, for perhaps one has erred concerning the reasoning behind the ruling in that particular case...”.

BT Bava Batra 131a.

And see Rambam ’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Introduction(Kafich ed.), 46: “the legal activity of all who arose after Ravina and Rav Ashi is confined to the understanding of the work they composed(chiberu), to which it is for­bidden to add and from which it is forbidden to detract.”

On the use of the title gaon to describe the rosh yeshivah(head of the Talmu­ dic academy) in Babylonia from the sixth-century C.E. onward, see Robert Brody , The Geonim of Babylonia and the Shaping of Medieval Jewish Culture(New Haven : Yale U. Press, 1998), 49.

Isadore Twersky , Introduction to the Code of Maimonides(New Haven : Yale U. Press, 1980), 55 and 160. See, in general, Meir Havatzelet, Harambam vehage'onim(Jerusalem : Sura, 1967). And see Rambam ’s own Introduction to