Taking Precedent Seriously 65

107. 108.

109.

110.

Ww NN

9.

22,

23.

24,

See the sources in note 97.

For a list of some of the works that contain these rules, see Elon, Jewish Law, 1540-1555. No value judgment is implied here. The establishment of some sort of regimen for determining the“correct” decision on a disputed matter may very well be a social or political necessity in a legal community; see Y. Kahana, Mechkarim besifrut hateshuvot, 1-8. My point is simply that this is one of the ways that a consensus view emerges out of a previously open debate over the“right” answer.

On the formation of this consensus see Mark Washofsky,“Abortion and the Halakhic Conversation,” in Walter Jacob and Moshe Zemer , eds., The Fetus and Fertility in Jewish Law(Pittsburgh and Tel Aviv : The Freehof Institute of Progressive Halakhah, 1995), 39-89, especially at notes 1-9. See also the forth­coming doctoral dissertation of Daniel Schiff for a comprehensive analysis of the history of the abortion controversy in Jewish law.

For background see Avraham Freimann, Seder kiddushin venisu’in(Jerusalem : Mosad Harav Kook, 1964); Y. Z. Kahana, Sefer ha*agunot(Jerusalem : Mosad Harav Kook, 1954); and Mark Washofsky,“The Recalcitrant Husband,” Jew­ish Law Annual 4(1981), 144-166.

. Eliezer Berkovits , tenai benisu’in uveget(Jerusalem : Mosad Harav Kook,

1966).

. Menachem M. Kasher ,“Be inyan tenai benisu’in,” Noam 12(1969), 338-353. . The rabbinical reactions to that ill-fated proposal are collected in Ein tenai

benisu’in(Vilna, 1930).

. Shlomo Riskin , Women and Jewish Divorce(Hoboken : Ktav, 1989).

. BT Ketubot 63a-b; Rashi, Ketubot 63b, s.v. la kayafinan lah; Yad, Ishut 14:8.

. See Tosafot, BT Ketubot 63b, s.v. aval.

. See Beit Yosef, EHE 77, fol. 115b-116a, and SA EHE 77:2.

.See the review of Riskin ’s book by Gedalia Dov Schwartz in Tradition 25:2

(1990), 94-96.

On the other hand, some authorities are willing to consider the argument of ma’is alay as one of several factors—though not the exclusive factor—in per­suading a rabbinical court to accept a divorce document of questionable validity. See R. Ezra Basri,“Get Me useh,” Shenaton hamishpat ha’iori 16-17 (1990-1991), 535-553.

.The word reflects Ronald Dworkin ’s discussion of the“gravitational force”

of precedent; Taking Rights Seriously(Cambridge , MA : Harvard U. Press , 1977), 111.

.Emanuel Feldman ,“Trends in the American Yeshivot: A Rejoinder,” in

Reuven P. Bulka, Dimensions of Orthodox Judaism(New York : Ktav, 1983), at 334-336.

Yosef Dov Soloveitchik , Shi‘urim lezekher abba mari z”1(Jerusalem : Akiva Yosef , 1983), at 428.

See Walter S. Wurzburger ,“The Conservative View of Halakhah is Non-Tra­ditional,” Judaism 38(1989), 377-379.

We should not claim too much for the responsum in this regard. The teshuvah does not necessarily render a chronological account of its author’s thought processes. For example, although the responsum usually presents the ques­tion, followed by the halakhic argumentation that leads to its answer, it may well be that the meshiv arrived at his answer prior to his considering those