Joan S. Friedman
49.
50
be the old ones. But only if we understand that we have adopted them, and not that it’s Torah mi-Sinai.”(AJA C-229)
In the words of Kaufmann Kohler :“For the pagan mind in general the ceremonies constitute religion, which is viewed as a mode of worship void of ethical purposes. In the course of time however, the original object of these ceremonies is forgotten, and they become empty forms until upon a higher stage they are invested with new meaning and made to convey higher thoughts. There is, consequently a singular affinity noticeable between the ceremonies of various peoples and ¢ lasses, since, as a rule, they have a com
mon origin in primitive life. Ceremonies are never the creations of individu
als; they grow and change like languages. Each ceremony may thus be traced to its origin in primitive time We, who behold in religion an ever
progressive force working through the inner consciousness of man, first col
lectively and afterwards individually, must ascertain the origin and purpose of each and every ceremony in order to find out whether by appealing to our minds and hearts it fulfills a religious function or w hether it has become an
empty shell with the kernel gone In thus reviewing the entire system of
Jewish observances as they have come down to us through the centuries, we find them to be indispensable forms of expressing the religious feelings prompted by the various events of life. As we advance in culture, enlighten ment, and refinement, these various ceremonies may appear to us as empty shells void of meaning, but we must never forget that nothing grows on the tree or in the soil without shielding leaf and husk. Abstract truth and ethical
practice fail to satisfy the religious craving of man. He needs ceremonies that
impress him w ith the nearness and the holiness of the divine.’ Kaufmann Kohler ,“The Origin and Function of Ceremonies in Judaism,” CCAR Year
book, Vol. 17, 1907, pp. 208, 210, 221
Freehof, pp. 31{f.
Freehof, p 56.
Freehof, p. 71.
Freehof, pp. 88-89 Although he does not explicitly mention it here, the Reform decision to rely on“the legal safeguards” of the“law of the state” and to regard the religious dimension as the marriage’s“spiritual and moral side” has been frequently justified by appeal to the halakhic principle of dina de-malkhuta dina. Halakhically, however, this principle, however, does not function in the realm of issur. Elon, vol. I, pp. 132ff.
Freehof, pp. 99ff. The section on civ il divorce is by far the lengthiest single section in both volumes and constitutes a history of the issue and a discus sion of all the complexities inherent in the Reform acceptance of civil divorce The source of this complexity is the fact that the modern state regulates mar riage and divorce, considering them to be matters of civil law; but for Jewish law they are both in the realm of issur, although there are matters on marmon subsumed within tem. In drawing the dividing line between“civil” and “religious” matters for Jews in the modern state, Reform eliminated the legal aspect from marriage and the religious aspect from divorce. The latter has more serious consequences for indiv idual Jews. ,
Freehof, p. 118f.
Freehof, p. 133ff